Berkeley and Orthodoxy

Berkeley is (in)famous for his ontological pronouncements that all that exist are minds and their ideas, that esse est percipi ("to be is to be perceived"), and that material objects do not exist unperceived. All of this sounds rather unrealistic (for a number of different senses of "realism") and even seems to go against what scripture presupposes about reality. The idea here is that insofar as God created the world, independently of Himself and of us, he conferred upon it an independent reality capable of subsisting apart from any mind's perception of it (or, at least, apart from any finite mind's perception of it). If this is so, if this is the proper metaphysical reading of God's creation, then Berkeley is theologically unorthodox in his philosophy.

Yet Berkeley (who became a bishop in the Anglican church later in life) was quite serious about being theologically orthodox. He wanted to give God a central, providential role to play in his philosophy and argued that his philosophy was completely consistent with the teaching of scripture. James Spiegel, in his essay "The Theological Orthodoxy of Berkeley's Immaterialism," argues not only that Berkeley's immaterialist philosophy is consistent with scripture ("the consistency thesis"), but that there is reason to think that it is endorsed by scripture ("the endorsement thesis"). Spiegel considers several objections to the consistency thesis and respective Berkeleyan replies. Here are some highlights.

1) Objection: Commonsense realism is the view adopted by and presupposed by scripture--the view that objects are self-subsistent, that they exist even while unperceived. There could be a number of replies that Berkeley could make here.

First, the objection focuses on the actual existence and subsistence of objects, whereas the "to be" in Berkeley's esse est percipi focuses on the essence of objects--it is of the object's essence that it be perceived. What this does for Berkeley is to take the focus away from the actual and current perception of the object and place the focus on the perceptable nature of the object. For instance, if I leave my desk and walk outside, is my desk still there in the room when I am not perceiving it? Yes, says Berkeley, because it is the case that if I were in my room then I would be perceiving my desk. I need not be currently perceiving the desk in order to say that it subsists; I need only say that it is perceivable, that its essence is to be perceived (whether currently or at some other time).

Second, Berkeley claims that scripture is really neutral on the question of whether or not objects continue to exist unperceived. We might think that it presupposes the existence of a Lockean material substance (the "supposed I know not what" of Locke's that "stands under" an objects properties and that continues to exist even while unperceived--in fact, Lockean material substance is imperceivable), but we're imposing this interpretation upon scripture, not getting it from scripture.

Third, the objection supposes that not only is realism (with its corresponding notion, in Berkeley's mind, of Lockean material substance) the commonsense position, but also that scripture is in line with common sense and Berkeley's immaterialism is not in line with common sense. The latter claim seems substantiated, where commonsensical means what is likely to be accepted by the Average Joe. Berkeley’s immaterialism is rather esoteric, and nearly everyone, when faced with Berkeley’s philosophy, is reticent to accept it. In reply, Spiegel makes an interesting point: Even if realism/materialism has common sense on its side, common sense is not necessarily on scripture’s side. There are plenty of things that happen in scripture that go against what the Average Joe is willing to accept as true, what is reflective of reality, and what is non-paradoxical. “Immaterialism, as it turns out, just might be one of the many non-commonsensical doctrines which is either allowed by or, as I shall suggest, actually recommended by the scriptures” (221).

2) A point Berkeley makes in regards to creation by God is that God’s use of material substance in creating the world would be superfluous. Will, for Berkeley, is the power to produce ideas. Creation is perfectly explicable in terms of God’s will without the need for material substance. In fact, the primacy of material substance would make God’s will superfluous, which Berkeley thinks would open the door for atheism. If at any point in the game we cease to rely completely on God, in this case not only for creating the world but also for continuously and providentially upholding the world by the word of His power (Heb. 1:3), then we leave open the possibility of the atheist to deny the need for God's continuing providential control since the world is perfectly able to continue on its own apart from Him (or from us).

This is part of Spiegel's defense of the endorsement thesis, and I rather like it. It makes God out to be the providential Creator and Sustainer of the world, giving Him an absolutely central place in Berkeley's philosophy. Note this nice passage from Berkeley:

This visual language proves, not a creator merely, but a provident governor, actually and intimately present, and attentive to all our interests and motions, who watches over our conduct, and takes care of our minutest actions and designs throughout the whole course of our lives, informing, admonishing, and directing incessantly, in a most evident and sensible manner. (from Alciphron: Or the Minute Philosopher (part IV, section 14))

At the end of the article, as another part of his defense of the endorsement thesis, Spiegel turns to the concept of our being divine image bearers and goes on to suggest a number of interesting analogies between divine creation and human speech. I will not recount them here. Perhaps I will find time in a day or so. In the meantime, Spiegel at least gives us some good food for thought regarding how we could view Berkeley's weird philosophy as actually being theologically orthodox.

Lost: Philosophers

I'm still not exactly sure what the writers are doing with the philosopher references in the names of some of the characters. I'm not sure how much of a connection to draw between the characters' actions and attitudes and the main views of their philosopher namesakes. I keep looking for some deeper meaning, some unambiguous connection between the philosopher's views and the basic, stable characters of their namesakes, but I seem to come up empty. The emptiness most likely stems from the fact that since I don't see any explicit connections, I lose interest in looking for implicit ones. Too much work for this lazy guy. Nonetheless...

Desmond David Hume - Philosopher namesake: David Hume
John Locke - Philosopher namesake: John Locke
Rousseau - Philosopher namesake: Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Both Hume and Locke are two of the three philosophers called the British Empiricists. (George Berkeley is the third.) The label "empiricist" signifies their epistemological views - their ideas about where our knowledge about things comes from and how that knowledge is justified. Locke is also well known for his views on government (supposedly his views had quite an effect on some of our Founding Fathers), but I will set that aside for now. Hume and Locke held that our ideas of things (specifically, what they called "matters of fact," which encompass things like concrete objects and events) comes from our sense experience. Hume in particular held that unless an idea we have can be traced back to some sense experience, our knowledge of it cannot be justified, although we can (and do) still act upon that idea or have that idea play a valuable role in our lives. For instance, Hume thought that the idea of causation (one thing causing another thing to do something) included the idea of a necessary connection between the cause and effect, but concluded that all we actually experience is a constant conjunction between the cause and effect. That is, we never actually experience that the cause and effect necessarily go together (which implies that they will on every occasion in the future), only that they have occurred together in the past. So, our idea of causation (insofar as it includes necessary connection) cannot be philosophically justified; yet, our belief that things cause other things to happen (and that the future will be like the past) is very useful and plays a pragmatic role in our lives. Locke was the one who talked about our mind being a blank slate on which experience writes; all the knowledge, beliefs, and ideas that end up in our minds comes from experience. (The Latin for Locke's "blank slate" is tabula rasa, which is the title of the first episode of Lost after the pilot episode. This suggests that all of the characters are starting with a clean slate from the viewer's perspective; as the show progresses, we learn more and more about them from their experiences.)

Neither (the Lost characters) Locke nor Desmond seem to be very good empiricists in a strict sense (which is probably not what the writers are going for anyway), especially with Locke's initial faith in the island and belief in all things mysterious and "metaphysical" (beyond the physical, beyond sense experience). But there are pockets of behavior that could be pointed to in defense of the philosopher-character connection. (This in itself isn't a very interesting hypothesis, since it could be said of anyone that in some particular instance they were acting like an empiricist.) For example, the interchange between Locke and Desmond in the Swan hatch while the timer was counting down was quite interesting. Both of them saw something, both had experiences that were informing them of the reality of what was going on in the hatch. Locke saw the Pearl orientation film, believed what Dr. Candle said in the film, and concluded that the Swan was, in fact, one big experiment. He was through with faith in the hatch. He wanted to see concrete proof (which he got, but which wasn't what he expected). Desmond also experienced something in the hatch - that there was, in fact, something to pushing that silly little button. But without the proof of experience, Locke was not willing to believe him. It wasn't until all things metal were flying through the air at the electromagnetic core that Locke finally acquiesced with his "I was wrong."

Rousseau, on the other hand, seems more explicitly connected with her philosopher namesake. The most well known position taken by Jean-Jacques Rousseau was that human beings are naturally good; they are "noble savages" whose goodness is marred by civilization, or, as he puts it, by the barnacles of society. The character Rousseau seems to fit the savage part well, and she appears to be pretty noble besides. She has been alone on the island for so long that she has broken the shackles of civilization and chiseled off the barnacles of society.

Interestingly, the philosopher Rousseau didn't like philosopher Locke's view on human nature. One of Locke's theses was that humans are not naturally good, they cannot coexist with one another in complete peace and security without rules and laws to keep them in check. This view of human nature led him to his views on the origin of government. Although Locke didn't think that the laws had to be backed by a civil government for them to be legitimate (as Thomas Hobbes thought), they still needed to be in place because people would inevitably get into fights. I'm not sure, however, that these views on human nature have much to do with the Lost characters' attitudes on the issue.

The Opinions of Pigs

Here's another nice nugget from J. S.:

"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."

(The context here is Mill's defense of qualitatively different kinds of pleasure. An objection against utilitarianism is that it is "a doctrine worthy only of swine" in that it makes the promotion of pleasure an ethical standard. Mill responds that the objection has only base pleasures in view, whereas humans are capable of "higher" pleasures of the intellect, of feelings, and of imagination. These higher pleasures are qualitatively superior to the lower pleasures of sensation, even when the higher pleasures are more difficult to achieve, and, consequently, are attended by pains of various kinds. So, Mill reasons, it is better to be seeking after these higher pleasures, even when the lower ones are not satisfied, than to be seeking after and be satisfied by only the lower pleasures. How do we know which ones are the higher and which the lower pleasures? Take someone who has had genuine experience of both. Whichever ones they would consistently choose as being better are the qualitatively superior ones. The opinions of pigs and fools don't count.)

Oh, Mill, You Slay Me

"There is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard whatever to work ill if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it."

-- John Stuart Mill

(In the wider context of this passage, Mill is answering an objection against utilitarianism. Simpl[istical]y, utilitarianism claims that an action's being right or wrong depends on whether the consequences of the action will bring about more pleasure than pain. The objection to this is that, practically speaking, there is not enough time prior to an action to do all the necessary calculations of pleasure/pain in order to come to a decision about the action's ethical value. Mill responds with an analogy: the same objection could be made against Christianity that, insofar as its ethical standard is the Bible, we don't have time to read the entire Bible prior to deciding whether a particular action is right or wrong. It is absurd to ignore the fact that for "the whole past duration of the human species" people have used the Bible to come up with a host of ethical rules of conduct that others can follow without having to be acquainted at every turn with the entire Bible. If we suppose that during this whole time people have been too idiotic to be able to come up with such rules, then the objection stands.)